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We analyse the effect of skill mismatch in a search model of equilibrium unemployment with risk-
neutral agents, endogenous job destruction, and two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. First, we examine
the interaction of labour market institutions and skill mismatch. We find that skill mismatch changes
the results obtained in a model with ex ante homogeneity. Second, we analyse the interaction of
skill mismatch and labour market institutions for the difference in the labour market experience of
continental Europe on the one hand and the US on the other hand. We find that within-group skill
mismatch cannot explain the rise in unemployment in Europe relative to the US. This result is due to
the endogeneity of job destruction and stands at odds with previous findings in the literature. We can,
however, confirm the fact that unemployment benefits potentially play a beneficial role by providing
a subsidy to search. Generally, we argue that in search models with fixed match characteristics, job
destruction should be endogenised in order to take account of heterogeneous decision rules.
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1 Introduction
High and persistent unemployment in many European countries has attracted much attention in the
economic literature, especially when contrasted with much lower levels of unemployment in the US (for
a summary, see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). One explanation that has been put forward in this
context is that it has become increasingly difficult for both workers and firms to find a suitable match in
the labour market. An indication for this is the outward shift of the Beveridge Curve in many European
countries. There is evidence from the earnings and income inequality literature that mismatch on the
labour market also affects workers and firms within narrowly defined groups. These observations lead
us to analyse a model, initially put forward by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), which features within-
group skill mismatch as a factor which has an impact on the labour market performance of an economy.
Differences between economies arise because of the interaction of this mismatch with labour market in-
stitutions. We alter the analysis by Marimon and Zilibotti by endogenising the job destruction decisions
in the economy. This significantly changes the results. Before describing the model in more detail, we
will first have a closer look at the empirical evidence.
The empirical literature on aggregate labour market has for some time not only been looking at the
level of unemployment, but also at the role of worker flows (cf. Burda and Wyplosz, 1994, for a seminal
article). The information content of worker flows makes it possible to analyse the causes of unemployment
as well as unemployment dynamics in more detail, especially with respect to the heterogeneities on the
labour market. For the time period starting in the early 1960s and ending in the late 1990s, the quarterly
data from five OECD countries on the stock of unemployment, as well as on worker flows into and out
of unemployment feature the following stylised facts:1 first, while unemployment in the US remained
at a (relatively) constant level - roughly 5-6%- , it has increased dramatically in European economies -
from about 2-3% to over 10% in France and Germany, for example. Second, worker flows into and out
of unemployment, normalised by the labour force, do not show a clear trend in the US with a mean of
about 7%, while they increased in Europe, e.g. roughly doubling in France and in Germany from about
2% to 4%. Nevertheless, they remained way below the US figures at the end of the 1990s. The same
features are true for the unemployment inflow rate (defined as unemployment inflows divided by the
number of employed workers). Finally, over the time period considered, the outflow rate (outflows from
unemployment divided by the stock of unemployment) was relatively constant in the US - fluctuating
between 1 and 1.5 - , but was reduced to about 1/4 of its starting value in Europe - from around 1.5-2
to under 0.5 in France and Germany. This implies a quadrupling of the duration of unemployment.
Apart from the level of unemployment and worker flows on the labour market, recent labour market
1Cf. Bachmann (2003) for details. The countries covered are France, Germany, Spain, the UK and the US.
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research has focussed on the evolution of earnings and income inequality. As for the former, several
stylised facts emerge.2 Looking at the levels of earnings inequality in different industrialised countries at
the end of the 1980s, the US, Canada, and the UK stand out as the countries with the highest figures.
Germany and the Netherlands stand at the other side of the spectrum. As for the evolution of earnings
inequality from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, there was a large increase in the US. This was partly
due to strongly growing returns to education during the 1980s, and to a milder increase in the returns to
experience. However, there was also a large rise in wage dispersion even within education and experience
groups. The picture for other industrialised countries is mixed. On the one hand, the UK and Canada
experienced a strong increase in earnings inequality, both between and within skill groups. Germany and
Italy do not show any signs of increased earnings inequality until the late 1980s. Finally, France features
some modest growth in earnings inequality, which mainly seems to be due to between-group effects.
Another empirical feature of labour markets in the OECD has been an instability of the Beveridge Curve
(cf. Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and Quintini, 2003). In the US, the Beveridge Curve shifted outwards in
the 1970s. However, this move was undone by a later backward shift, which brought the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment virtually back to where it had been. Thus, the location of the Beveridge Curve was
virtually the same in the 1960s and the late 1990s. In most of the large European economies, namely
France, Germany, and Spain, however, the outward shift of the Beveridge Curve was not undone. This
is an indication that mismatch on the labour market increased between the 1960s and the 1990s. As
pointed out by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (2005), this outward shift of the Beveridge Curve occurred
in all sectors of the economy to a roughly equal extent.
The main explanations for differences in unemployment levels between the US and Europe are differ-
ent shocks, different institutions, and an interaction between shocks and institutions. The latter has been
analysed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2001), who find significant empirical evidence for this explanation.
Ljungqvist and Sargent take these empirical findings as a starting point for their theoretical model. In
their reply to Den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey (2001), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002) introduce human
capital into an otherwise standard matching model of unemployment. While on the job, workers accu-
mulate human capital. When unemployed, however, workers face a certain probability of losing their
human capital. An increase in this probability is called an increase in ”turbulence”. Given differences
in institutions (modelled as different levels of unemployment benefits), an increase in turbulence can
have very different implications. High unemployment benefits (the ”European” regime) in combination
with high turbulence lead to high unemployment and low exit rates from unemployment. An increase in
turbulence given low unemployment benefits (the ”US” regime) has negligible effects. Thus, the effect
of a specific shock depends on the institutional features of the economy affected. However, this model
2See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for a summary.
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has several shortcomings. First, it does not replicate the increase in unemployment inflows observed in
Europe. Second, the rise in European unemployment and the fall of the unemployment outflow rate is
attributed to highly skilled workers. This does not correspond to the empirical evidence (Cf. Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999). And, third, job destruction is taken to be exogenous. It has been shown that
endogenising the job destruction decision can significantly alter the results.3 4
Aghion, Howitt, and Violante (2002) argue that the increase in inequality in the US which is due to a rise
in the return to permanent components of individual skills accounts for between half and two thirds of
the increase in inequality. The remaining part is attributable to the transitory components of earnings.
The latter is influenced by the diffusion of new technologies, which increase the importance of stochas-
tic factors. This in turn raises the premium to workers with no observable distinguishing characteristics
other than their ”good fortune”. In other words, within-group inequality rises with technological progress.
Within-group heterogeneity was first analysed in a search and matching framework by Marimon and Zili-
botti (2001). They use a matching model of the labour market with exogenous job destruction. There is
two-sided ex ante heterogeneity, i.e. firms have specific skill requirements, and workers have specific skills.
Worker skills are exogenously given and uniformly distributed along the unit circle. Firms choose their
skill requirement endogenously along the same circle. Skill mismatch is then introduced into the model
via the production function. Workers and firms with a better ”fit” are more productive than matches
with a worse fit. The circular set-up of skills and skill requirements reflects our focus on within-group
effects. An increase in mismatch is an increase of the importance of skill differences in the production
function. Here the intuition is that faster technological progress leads to changing requirements by the
firm, which the worker might be able to fulfill only partly. One can also think about this as the economy
becoming more complex, i.e. the ”variety” of skill requirements by firms increases. This happens in the
economy as a whole, which implies that all firms and workers are affected symmetrically. This intuition
is in line with the fact that the outward shift in the Beveridge Curve mentioned above occurred across
all sectors by a comparable amount (cf. Layard et al. (2005), p.326). An aggregate technological shock
impacts on the degree of mismatch in the economy. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) then contrast two
economies: one with high unemployment insurance (”Europe”), the other one with low unemployment
insurance (”US”). An increase in skill mismatch doubles unemployment in the European economy. In
the laissez-faire economy, unemployment stays roughly constant, but wage inequality increases more and
overall productivity grows less. Unemployment benefits play two distinct roles. On the one hand, they
increase the value of unemployment, thus reducing the incentive to take up a job. This disincentive effect
3Cf. Haefke, 1999.
4It should also be pointed out that the simulation exercise by Ljungqvist and Sargent suggests a scenario that is different
from the stylised facts even with respect to the level of unemployment. As pointed out above, European unemployment
was way below the US figures in the 1970s.
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reduces unemployment outflows and unambiguously leads to a higher level of unemployment. On the
other hand, unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy.5 This means that, with higher unemployment
benefits, workers in bad matches are more likely to leave those matches because unemployment is less
painful. They can then look for a new job, hoping that the future match will feature a low degree of skill
mismatch. As a result, inflows into unemployment out of ”bad” jobs (those with high skill mismatch) rise,
and the distribution of jobs is shifted towards ”good”, and hence more stable, jobs. Therefore, overall
inflows into unemployment can fall, which has the potential to reduce the unemployment rate. Which
effect prevails, and hence the ultimate impact of unemployment benefits on the level of unemployment,
is not clear a priori.
In this paper, we use the skill mismatch model by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) and endogenise the
job destruction decision in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We thus change the analysis of
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) insofar that we specifically model the productivity shock and endogenise
job destruction. On the one hand, this allows us to analyse the effect of job protection legislation along
the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Firing costs unambiguously reduce job creation and job de-
struction in the search model with ex ante homogeneous workers by lowering the reservation productivity.
The effect on the level of unemployment, however, is not clear-cut. In the model with skill mismatch, an
additional factor to consider is job rejection. Firing costs, by lowering the reservation productivity level,
increase the expected duration of a match. At the time the two partners to a match take the decision
whether to form the match, the extent of skill mismatch is known. As the latter is fixed over the lifetime
of the match, matches with a high skill mismatch are more likely to be rejected with higher firing costs.
This means again that firing costs tend to lead to a lower fraction of ”bad” matches in the economy,
while the effect on unemployment is not clear a priori. Calibrating our baseline model, we find that
firing costs have a non-monotonic impact on the level of unemployment. We put this down to the two
counteracting forces just described. As for the effects of an increase of the importance in mismatch in the
economoy, we find that endogenising job destruction completely changes the results, compared to a model
with exogenous job destruction. More specifically, a shock to mismatch in combination with a moder-
ate amount of unemployment benefits does not lead to an increase in unemployment any more, because
the increase in the duration of good matches outweighs the lower expected productivity of future matches.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section, we describe the modelling framework. The
key ingredients are specific skill requirements by firms and specific skills by workers, and search frictions
5Note that this a model with risk-neutral agents, where there is no need for insurance. An analysis of the role of
unemployment benefits as an insurance in a search model with ex ante heterogeneity can be found in Shimer and Smith
(2001).
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which are captured by a matching function. We then show that, given the assumptions of the model,
two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity is equivalent to ex-post heterogeneity. We then prove existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. In the third section, the model is calibrated. First, we examine the impact of
the replacement rate and of firing costs on the level of unemployment. Second, we subject two different
economic regimes, a laissez-faire state and a welfare state, to a shock to skill mismatch. This is done in
order to examine how this shock, given endogenous job destruction, interacts with labour market insti-
tutions. The final section summarises and concludes the discussion.
2 The model
2.1 Ex-ante heterogeneity, production, and search frictions
There is a continuum of infinitely lived workers with mass normalised to one. Workers are heterogeneous
in the sense that they are characterised by idiosyncratic types of human capital, or ”skills”. These skills,
denoted by sw, are uniformly distributed on a circle and are fixed forever. No ranking of skills (”high”,
”low”, etc.) whatsoever is implied. The only important feature in this context is the specificity of human
capital, which is also the reason for the circular setup. This can be understood best when contrasted
with a linear setup. Imagine worker skills were distributed uniformly on a line of finite length. Then a
worker located at one of the extreme ends of the line has very different expectations about the distribution
of firms relative to his position than a worker located in the middle of the line. This is true for most
firm distributions, and in particular for the uniform distribution. The situation is very different in the
case of a circle. Here, two workers located at different points of the circle have the same expectations
about their distance to firms on the circle, given that the latter are distributed uniformly (we show below
that this is the case in our model). The circular setup is therefore chosen for two reasons: first, it yields
identical expectations among heterogeneous workers. This goes along well with our focus on within-group
differences. Second, as turns out below, some of the computations can be dramatically simplified. As
for workers’ states, they can be either employed or unemployed. There is no on-the-job search. In the
former case they receive a net wage of (1 − τ) · w(.), in the latter case they receive an unemployment
benefit (1− τ) · b(.). The government levies the wage tax in order to finance the unemployment benefit.
The mass of firms in the economy is endogenously determined. Vacancies incur a flow cost c. Each
firm has a specific skill requirement, sf , which is located on the same circle as worker skills. Firms can
employ one worker at the most. The production of a worker-firm match takes place according to a linear
production function, which consists of two factors: an idiosyncratic productivity parameter, x, which
is stochastic, and a measure of the mismatch between the worker skill and the skill requirement of the
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firm. The latter is defined as the distance on the circle between the skill parameters of the two parties,
δ ≡ |sf − sw|. Output at a given moment in time then reads
ϕ(x, sf, sw) = max(η + x, η + x + a · (1− γ · δ))
The parameter a indicates how important skill mismatch is for productivity. More specifically, a rise in
a increases the weight of skill mismatch in the production function. This is meant to capture the stylised
fact of an outward shift of the Beveridge curve, which is equivalent to an increase in mismatch. The
parameter η is a positive shift parameter that is used in the calibration exercise, and γ is a positive scale
parameter. Idiosyncratic productivity x is drawn from a distribution F (x) with support in the range
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Draws are taken from the distribution at Poisson rate λ.
Job destruction is endogenous. The decision whether a job is destroyed is taken each time a shock to
productivity arrives. A firm that destroys a match has to pay a firing cost T . As shown below, just
as in the standard search model of equilibrium unemployment there will be a reservation productivity
level, where the parties to the match are just indifferent between continuing production and separating.
Denoting with J(.) the value of a job to the firm, this level is given by the condition J(.) + T = 0.
The labour market displays frictions which are captured by a matching function, m(u, v), where u and v
denote the mass of unemployed workers and of vacancies, respectively. Search is undirected. Furthermore,
there are no informational asymmetries, which means that when a firm and a worker meet, both know
their own and their partner’s type. Following standard notation6, we define the rate at which vacant jobs
become filled as q(θ) ≡ m(uv , 1), where θ ≡ vu is the tightness of the labour market. The frictions on the
labour market derive, e.g., from information imperfections about potential trading partners, the absence
of perfect insurance markets, slow mobility, and congestion from large numbers. The matching function
features the standard assumptions of concavity and homogeneity of degree 1.
2.2 The value functions
Given the above environment, the lifetime of a firm is as follows (see also Figure 1 in the appendix): a firm
decides to enter the labour market and therefore creates a vacancy of type sf at a cost. With probability
q(θsf ), the firm is matched with an unemployed worker. Worker skills in this case are distributed according
to a distribution function G1(sw). If the match is profitable for the values x and δ, it will start production,
and a wage wo(1, δ) is paid to the worker. Otherwise, the match does not become productive, the
firm is destroyed, and the worker remains unemployed. Shocks to idiosyncratic productivity x arrive
with Poisson rate λ. Every time a shock hits x, the profitability of the match changes and the ”stop
production”/”continue production” decision has to be taken anew. The mismatch parameter δ is fixed
over the lifetime of the match. Because of firing costs the threat points of the partners to a bargain
6Cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2000.
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differ depending on whether the match has been newly formed or whether it is a continuing match. We
therefore introduce a two-tier wage structure for these two cases. This also implies two values for the job
to a firm, and two values for the job to a worker. The outside value of a job, Jo, the inside value of a
job, J , and the value of a vacancy, V , are therefore: 7
rJosf (x, sw) = ϕ(x, sf, sw)− wo(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0
max{Jsf (x′, sw), Vsf − T}dF (x′) (1)
−λJosf (x, sw) (2)
rJsf (x, sw) = ϕ(x, sf, sw)− w(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0
max{Jsf (x′, sw), Vsf − T}dF (x′) (3)
−λJsf (x, sw) (4)






max{Josf (x′, sw′)− Vsf , 0}dF (x′)dG1(sw′) (5)
where x′ and sw′ denote new values of x and sw, T is the firing tax, and where the ”.o”-superscript
denotes an outside wage/value.
Workers can be in either of two states: employment or unemployment. When employed, workers
receive a wage (1 − τ) · w. As in the case of the firms, Poisson arrival rates determine the probability
of changes in idiosyncratic productivity x. The type of skill requirement a worker encounters in a new
match is drawn from the distribution function G2(sf). For a given worker skill, the flow value of working
in a filled (outside) job, W (W o), and of unemployment, U , are:
rW osw(x, sf) = (1− τ) · wo(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0
max(Wsw(x′, sf), Usw)dF (x′)− λW osw(x, sf) (6)
rWsw(x, sf) = (1− τ) · w(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0
max(Wsw(x′, sf), Usw)dF (x′)− λWsw(x, sf) (7)






max{W osw(x′, sf ′)− Usw, 0}dF (x′)dG2(sf ′) (8)
where x′ and sf ′ denote new values of x and sf , respectively.
2.3 Equilibrium
Overall equilibrium is attained through the agents’ maximisation problems, a wage-setting rule, a free-
entry condition in the market for vacancies, equilibrium in the labour market, and a balanced government
budget. We first prove that wages and value functions are independent of ”absolute” skill type, and then
show what this implies for the optimising behaviour of workers and firms. Finally, we state the equilibrium
conditions of the economy.
7The derivations of the value functions are described in the appendix.
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2.3.1 Wages and value functions
Free entry into the market for vacancies implies that the value of a vacancy is zero in equilibrium, i.e.
Vsf = 0. The following lemma shows that firms with different skill requirements have the same probability
of matching with a worker.
Lemma 1. Let the matching function be characterised by homogeneity of degree 1, and let the distribution
of unemployment be identical across skill types. Then, the matching probability is the same across vacancy
types.








max{J0sf (x′, sw′), 0}dF (x′)dG1(sw′)
c · vsf














max{J0sf (x′, sw′), 0}dF (x′)dG1(sw′)
where we have used the definition of the matching function and its property of homogeneity of degree
one. With an identical distribution of unemployment across skill types, the right-hand side, the expected
value of a job of skill requirement sf , is the same across skill requirements, therefore:
q(θsf ) = q(θs̃f ) ∀sf, s̃f
Given Lemma 1, we can define a common market tightness for all matches as θ ≡ θsf . It should be
noted that this is not the same as overall market tightness, which is given by Θ ≡ ∫ 1
0
θsfdG2(sf).
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of identical matching probabilities.
Corollary 1. Firms will open their vacancies in such a way that they are spread evenly across the circle
of skill requirements.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that the distribution of vacancies is uneven. Then, the matching
probability of a vacancy is higher where the mass of vacancies is lower, which is a contradiction with
Lemma 1.








max{Josf (1, sw′), 0}dF (x′)dG1(sw′) (9)
9
Equation (9) tells us that the expected costs from opening a vacancy will equal the expected benefits,
given the firm’s type and the firm’s expectations about worker types.
Wages are determined in a Nash bargain, i.e. the parties to the match choose the wage such as to
maximise the joint match surplus, S(x, sf, sw) ≡ Wsw(x, sf) + Jsf (x, sw)− Usw, where we have already
used the fact that Vsf = 0 in equilibrium. Inside and outside wages satisfy the following conditions:
wo(x, sf, sw) = arg max(W osw(x, sf)− Usw)β(Josf (x, sw))(1−β)
w(x, sf, sw) = arg max(Wsw(x, sf)− Usw)β(Jsf (x, sw) + T )(1−β).
with β being the bargaining power of the worker. The first-order conditions for a match with worker’s
skills sw and firm’s skill requirements sf are therefore
(1− τ)β(Josf (x, sw)) = (1− β)(W osw(x, sf)− Usw) (10)
(1− τ)β(Jsf (x, sw) + T ) = (1− β)(Wsw(x, sf)− Usw) (11)
In the appendix, we show that the outside and inside wages can be expressed as follows:
wo(x, sf, sw) = (1− β) · b + β[ϕ(x, sf, sw) + θc− λT ] (12)
w(x, sf, sw) = (1− β)b + β(ϕ(x, sf, sw) + θc + rT ) (13)
As in the standard search and matching model, wages depend positively on productivity, market tightness,
and creation costs. Furthermore, the firing costs have a negative impact on outside wages, but a positive
impact on inside wages. The reason for this feature is that in the latter case the costs are sunk, and
therefore enter the Nash bargain to the detriment of the firm. It is also worth noting that the tax rate
does not enter the expressions for wages, the reason being that unemployment benefits are taxed as well.
This implies that one does not have to worry about the existence of multiple equilibria. Rocheteau (1999)
argues that a balanced-budget rule for setting taxes can give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria, because
firms do not take into account the externality they are exerting on the government budget, and hence on
tax rates, when they open up a vacancy. High taxes can therefore lead to low recruiting effort by firms,
which results in high unemployment. This effect does not arise here because tax rates do not enter the
wage, and therefore they do not feature in the expected gain from opening up a vacancy either. We now
show that wages only depend upon idiosyncratic productivity x and mismatch δ.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, wages are independent of ”absolute” skill type in the sense that the skill type
enters wages only through the distance function δ = |sf − sw|, i.e. w(x, sf, sw) = w(x, δ).
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Proof. This follows immediately from equations (12) and (13), the fact that production depends only
upon δ, and the fact that market tightness is independent of skills (Corollary 1).
The next lemma shows that in this model, we can replace the distribution functions G1(sw) and
G2(sf) by a common distribution function for δ, G(δ). This result is due to the assumption of undirected
search, and the fact that both workers’ skills and firms’ skill requirements are uniformly distributed along
a circle.















Using this lemma, we show in the next theorem that the value functions do not depend on absolute
skill type either.
Theorem 1. In equilibrium, the value functions depend on δ and x only.
Proof. This follows from the fact that market tightness, and hence matching probabilities, are independent
of skills (Corollary 1), and the facts that production and wages depend on δ and x only (definition of the
production function, and Lemma 2).
As a consequence of theorem 1 and of lemma 3, we can drop sf and sw from the expressions for V
and U , and replace sf and sw in the expressions for the other value functions and for the wages with δ.
Corollary 2. The value functions for unemployment and for vacancies are independent of absolute skills
and absolute skill requirements, i.e. Usw = U , Vsf = V .
Corollary 3. The value functions for a firm’s filled job and for a worker being employed are independent
of absolute skills and absolute skill requirements, i.e. Jsf (x, sw) = J(x, δ), Wsw(x, sf) = W (x, δ).
The above results imply that we can conveniently reformulate the type of two-sided ex ante-heterogeneity
present in this model as ex ante-homogeneity by means of a variable which has an impact on ex post-
heterogeneity. In other words, heterogeneity among matches only arises after a match has been formed,
and it stems from two sources: skill mismatch, represented by the variable δ, which is fixed over the
lifetime of the match, and idiosyncratic productivity x, which is subject to stochastic shocks.
2.3.2 Optimal stopping
We can now show that the reservation productivity, i.e. the productivity that makes the two partners
of a match just indifferent between continuing production and separating, exists, is unique, and that it
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depends only upon the variables x and δ (This is done in the appendix.). Hence, we can define reservation
productivity levels for the decision to form and to separate a match, respectively. There is one reservation
productivity level for match formation, which implies a reservation value for each of the two variables:
Rox indicates a cut-off value for δ, given x. Because productivity falls with rising mismatch, this value is
an upper bound for the value mismatch can take on in a productive match.If the measure of mismatch
rises above this threshold, the match does not come into existence. From the point of view of the firm,
whose skill requirement is fixed, this implies a lower and an upper bound for the worker’s skill. The
second reservation value for job creation is Roδ , which, as in the standard search model, is the lower bound
for x in a productive match. As for job destruction, Rδ indicates the threshold value for x, given δ. If
the stochastic variable x falls below this value, the match separates. Furthermore, with endogenous job
destruction and Nash bargaining, both match formation and separations will be consensual. From the
Nash bargain, the reservation values satisfy the following conditions:
Jo(Roδ , δ) = 0 (14)
Jo(x,Rox) = 0 (15)
J(Rδ, δ) = −T (16)
Given this reservation value, we obtain for the value functions:
rJo(x, δ) = ϕ(x, δ)− wo(x, δ) + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
J(x′, δ)dF (x′) + λF (Rδ)[V − T ]− λJ(x, δ)
rJ(x, δ) = ϕ(x, δ)− w(x, δ) + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
J(x′, δ)dF (x′) + λF (Rδ)[V − T ]− λJ(x, δ)





[Jo(x′, δ′)− V ]dF (x′)dG(δ′) (17)
rW o(x, δ) = (1− τ) · wo(x, δ) + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
W o(x′, δ)dF (x′) + λF (Rδ)U − λW o(x, δ) (18)
rW (x, δ) = (1− τ) · w(x, δ) + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
W (x′, δ)dF (x′) + λF (Rδ)U − λW (x, δ) (19)





[W (x′, δ′)− U ]dF (x′)dG(δ′) (20)
where Rox is implicitly defined by J
o(1, Rox) = 0. This means that it is the highest value δ can take in a
productive match, considering all possible values of x. If δ lies above this threshold, no production takes
place, no matter what x is. This value is obviously attained when x = 1. Conversely, Roδ is implicitly
defined by Jo(Roδ , 0) = 0, i.e. it is the lowest value x featured by a productive match, considering all
possible values of δ.
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2.3.3 The equilibrium conditions
In order to obtain an analytic solution to the model, we set initial productivity equal to one, i.e. x0 = 1.
To obtain an equilibrium in the labour market, we then need to solve a system of four equations, which
gives us the solution to the four unknowns market tightness (θ), unemployment (u), and the reservation








[ϕ(1, δ)− ϕ(Rδ, δ)]dG(δ)− (1− β)T (21)
ϕ(1, Rox) = b +
β
1− β θc + λT (22)
ϕ(1, Rox)− ϕ(Rδ, δ) = (r + λ)T (23)
Figure 2 depicts equations (21), the labour demand (LD) curve, and (22), the tightness curve, in
ϕ(Rδ, δ) − θ-space. The labour demand curve represents a negative relationship between reservation
productivity and tightness. The relationship is negative because with a higher reservation productivity,
firms open up fewer vacancies because the expected duration of a vacancy is high, i.e. expected search
costs are high. The tightness curve is a positive relationship between the two variables. The reason
for this is that higher market tightness increases the value of unemployment, decreasing the willingness
of unemployed workers to take up a job and thus raising reservation productivity Rδ. Together, the
two curves yield the equilibrium values of labour market tightness and reservation productivity for given
values of unemployment benefits b and taxes τ . The reservation productivity condition, equation (23),
shows that the firing costs drive a wedge between the job creation and the job destruction threshold. For
a given value of Rδ, we get a value for Rox. This is depicted in figure 4. Note that if firing costs were
equal to zero, the two reservation thresholds would be identical.
The level of unemployment is determined through equilibrium in the labour market. The latter obtains
when flows into and out of unemployment, i and o, are equalised. Inflows into unemployment are given
by the mass of profitable jobs being hit by a shock which makes them unprofitable. Outflows from
unemployment are equal to the product of the number of unemployed workers and the probability of a






















Together with the labour demand curve, equation (24) determines the number of vacancies and the level
of unemployment for given values of market tightness and employment distribution. This relationship,
the Beveridge Curve, is depicted in figure 3 in the appendix.
Finally, the equilibrium tax rate is determined by the government budget constraint:





w(x, δ) · e(x, δ)dF (x)dG(δ)
τ =
b · u




w(x, δ) · e(x, δ)dF (x)dG(δ)
(25)
where e(x, δ) is employment at productivity ϕ(x, δ). Note that this expression features the inside
values for the reservation productivities. The reason for this is that Rox < Rx and Roδ > Rδ. By using
the inside values, we therefore capture all the x− δ-combinations where production takes place.
Equations (21)-(25) fully characterise the equilibrium of the mismatch economy. Equilibrium exists
and is unique.
3 Calibration
3.1 The calibration strategy
We first calibrate the model for a low aggregate degree of mismatch and different levels of unemployment
benefits and firing costs. Ultimately, we are interested in the effect of an increase in skill mismatch on
the unemployment rate in different economic regimes. The latter are characterised by different levels of
firing costs and replacement rates. As described in the introduction, both policy variables play two roles
in the economy. Firing costs imply that agents are pickier when deciding on whether to match or not,
but they also lead to lower job destruction once a match has been formed. The replacement rate, and
hence unemployment benefits, reduce the incentive for an unemployed worker to match, while providing a
search subsidy at the same time. In order to understand better the different mechanisms at work, we first
calibrate the model for a range of different levels of firing costs and replacement rates, given a low degree
of mismatch in the economy. Then, we increase skill mismatch in different institutional settings. The
first setting pertains to a ”welfare state”, say, Europe, with positive unemployment benefits. The second
setting describes a laissez-faire economy, e.g. the United States. For simplicity, we assume that the level
of unemployment benefits is zero in this economy. Using the simulations below, we want to examine
which impact the different scenarios have, given different institutional backgrounds. The quantitative
results of this exercise will allow us to make a judgement on the importance of mismatch in generating
the differing labour market outcomes in the US and in ”Europe”.
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It is unfortunately not possible to simulate the above model without modification. The reason for this
is that, given the values for the variables and parameters stated above, for very low values of mismatch
some matches never get destroyed, no matter what the value of idiosyncratic productivity is. In other
words, for some values of mismatch, employment becomes an absorbing state. We therefore introduce
exogenous separations over and above the endogenous separations present in the model described in the
previous sections. In particular, we postulate that a match that has not been hit by an idiosyncratic
productivity shock has a positive probability s of being separated for exogenous reasons. This implies
that even matches with a very low degree of skill mismatch can get destroyed. We regard the presence of
some exogenous job destruction as a realistic feature of our model. We simulate the model by iterating
recursively on the value functions, the distribution of employment, and the government budget constraint,
making sure that we obtain the desired levels of unemployment inflows and the replacement rate, and
taking into account the government budget constraint. Unemployment benefits are chosen such as to
match the replacement rate. The algorithm used is as follows:
1. Start with an initial guess for the value and the level of unemployment, U and u, respectively, the
exogenous separation rate s, the tax rate τ , and unemployment benefits b.
2. Compute the decision rules, the agents’ value functions, and the wages.
3. Compute the distribution of employment over x and δ, the level of unemployment, and the inflows
into and outflows from unemployment.
4. Given the level of endogenous inflows into unemployment, set s such that overall inflows into
unemployment amount to 0.04.
5. Given the wages in the economy, set unemployment benefits such that the replacement rate is
attained.
6. Compute the tax rate necessary to finance unemployment benefits, given the distribution of em-
ployment in the economy.
7. Repeat steps (2)-(6) until convergence.
The parameters featuring in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) are set at the same values as in their cali-
bration exercise in order to make it easier to compare our results with theirs. This includes setting the
discount factor δ = 0.98. Given the time period of one quarter, this implies an annual interest rate of
2.7%. The grids for skill mismatch δ and stochastic productivity x lie in the intervals [0, 0.5] and [η, η+1],
respectively. The parameters for skill mismatch are a = 0.5 and γ = 2, respectively. The initial flow cost
incurred by a vacancy is c0 = 2.25. The stochastics are as follows. The draws of x and δ are taken from
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uniform distributions on their respective intervals. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), the shock
arrival rate λ is set equal to 0.1. The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas, with parameters A and α,
i.e. m(v, uk) = A · uαk v(1−α). The parameter value for the elasticity of the matching function is chosen
as common in the literature, i.e. ε = 0.5. The sharing parameter in the Nash bargain is β = 0.5. The
parameter values are summarised in the following table:
β 0.5 λ 0.1
c0 2.25 ε 0.5
η0 2.25 r 0.05
3.2 The baseline model
We simulate a discrete version of the mismatch model following the algorithm stated above. The results
produced by the baseline model are as expected: the surplus is rising in x and falling in δ. This is shown
in figure 5 in the appendix. In order to investigate the effect of the policy parameters, we calibrate the
model for different values of replacement rate ρ and firing costs T . The results are reproduced in table
1.
T= T= T= T= T= T=
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
ρ = 0 4.49 4.49 4.50 4.49 4.46 4.44
ρ = 0.1 4.71 4.73 4.72 4.72 4.72 4.69
ρ = 0.2 4.99 4.99 4.99 5.00 4.98 4.97
ρ = 0.3 5.32 5.33 5.33 5.33 5.33 5.31
ρ = 0.4 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.71 5.71 5.71
ρ = 0.5 6.17 6.19 6.20 6.20 6.22 6.22
Table 1: Unemployment rates at different levels of replacement rate ρ and firing costs T , α = 0.5
As one can see, the replacement rate raises the level of unemployment, while firing costs have a non-
monotonic impact. This is different from the results in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for the standard
search model without skill mismatch. First of all, the effects of the replacement rate are much less
pronounced here. While in the model without skill mismatch, raising the replacement rate from ρ = 0
to ρ = 0.5 more than doubles unemployment, the increase in unemployment in the skill mismatch model
is only slightly below 40%. This is due to the search subsidy effect of unemployment benefits present
in this model. Overall, the disincentive effect prevails over the search subsidy effect, but unemployment
rises less with unemployment benefits than in the model without skill mismatch.
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3.3 Increasing mismatch
We now want to analyse the impact of higher skill mismatch in the economy for different economic
policy regimes. For ease of exposition, and in order to make the results comparable with Marimon and
Zilibotti, we focus on two different regimes: one regime, the laissez-faire state (U), is characterised by a
replacement rate of 0 and no firing costs. The other regime, the welfare state (E), features a replacement




Except for the replacement rate, all parameter values are exactly the same in the two regimes. The
extent of mismatch prevailing in the economy is modelled by a change of the parameter a. Following
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), we increase a from 0.5 to 0.85 and set c1 = 2.4 and η1 = 2.4. We then
compare the ensuing steady states. The results are summarised in table 2.
α = 0.5 α = 0.85
Unemployment rate E 5.00 4.91
U 4.99 4.43
Inflow rate E 2.35 2.21
U 1.83 2.04
Inflow rate δ = min E 0 0
U 0 0
Inflow rate δ = max E 5.45 6.36
U 4.55 5.45
Ratio between E 1.21 1.233
90th-10th wage percentile U 1.234 1.244
Market tightness E 0.83 0.86
U 1.01 1.05
Total production E 2.609 2.920
U 2.588 2.914
Production per employed worker E 2.746 3.070
U 2.710 3.049
Table 2: Comparison between steady-states. Note: all rates in percent, inflow rates include endogenous
inflows only.
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The effects of an increase in mismatch are as follows: unemployment falls in both regimes. The same
is true for the endogenous inflow rate into unemployment. In order to see why this is so, we look at
the inflow rate for matches characterised by low mismatch (δ = min) and high mismatch (δ = max)
separately. First of all, note that the endogenous inflow rate for low mismatch matches is zero in both
regimes. This is due to the fact that such matches never get destroyed. The option value of these matches
is so high, that both firms and workers are always in favour of continuing production, even for very low
values of x. Furthermore, the inflow rate for firm-worker pairs featuring high mismatch considerably
rises in U and E. The fact that it is higher in E for both levels of aggregate mismatch reflects the search
subsidy role unemployment benefits play. This means that the distribution of matches is shifted towards
matches with a low degree of mismatch as mismatch becomes more important in the production function.
This increase of ”good” matches, which have a longer expected duration, thus outweighs the fall in the
duration of ”bad” matches. Overall, this leads to a reduction in the unemployment rate. The reason
why this effect does not feature in the model by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) is that they regard job
destruction not only as exogenous, but also as equal across match qualities. This implies that workers
are not allowed to react to a shock by changing the reservation productivity level Rδ. Clearly, this leaves
out the mechanism described above.
As for wages, we calculate the ratio between the upper decile of the wage distribution and the lower
decile of the wage distribution. In the laissez-faire state, this measure of wage inequality increases by
0.7%, which is low compared to the figures reported by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). The increase is
caused by the fact that, with a greater importance of mismatch in the production function, earnings
become more variable, depending on whether a match displays a higher or a lower degree of mismatch.
In the welfare state, an increase in a also leads to a rise in wage inequality. However, at 1.8%, the
rise is higher, contrary to what one might have expected. This is again due to two opposing effects
of unemployment benefits. On the one hand, unemployment benefits cut out low-paying jobs, which
reduces wage inequality by raising the level of wages and compressing the wage structure. On the other
hand, a closer inspection of the wage distribution (not presented here) reveals that the increase in wage
inequality is caused by a greater mass of workers employed in matches featuring low mismatch and low
idiosyncratic productivity, which pay a relatively low wage. The greater mass of workers in these jobs
is caused by the search subsidy effect of unemployment benefits. Workers stay in those low-paying jobs
because they expect idiosyncratic productivity to rise again, i.e. the option value of their current job is
high. Finally, total production increases in both regimes, the reason being that both employment and
mean production rise. Again, there is no qualitative difference between the two regimes. The reason for
this is the same as for the evolution of wages: unemployment benefits cut out some ”bad” jobs. But
this effect is undone by the shift of the distribution of employment towards matches characterised by low
mismatch and (temporarily) low idiosyncratic productivity.
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In summary, the above results show that endogenising job destruction in a model with skill-mismatch à
la Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) completely undoes the results obtained in a model with exogenous job
destruction. With exogenous job destruction, the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits outweigh
the search subsidy effects, raising unemployment as overall skill mismatch in the economy increases. With
endogenous job destruction and Nash bargaining, on the other hand, the second effect prevails, which
leads to a shift of the distribution of productive matches towards low-mismatch matches. The latter are
characterised by low levels of job destruction, which reduces inflows into unemployment and also the
unemployment rate. This mechanism also yields some unexpected results: low-mismatch matches do
not necessarily pay high wages for any realisation of idiosyncratic productivity x, but do not destroyed
endogenously because of their high option value. However, this means that these low-paying matches can
lead to an increase in wage inequality. The simulation above shows that this effect is even stronger with
higher unemployment benefits, because the mass of such low-mismatch but low-paying matches is higher
than with low unemployment benefits. Overall, these results demonstrate that search and matching mod-
els with ex ante heterogeneous agents and endogenous job destruction can yield some very interesting
and sometimes unexpected dynamics.
3.4 Extensions
Two crucial assumptions of the above model are, first, that unemployment benefits are independent of
previous wages, and second, that wages are free to adjust to economic shocks. As was pointed out above,
the latter fact leads to workers accepting temporary wage cuts if they are in a match characterised by
low mismatch and low idiosyncratic productivity x. Matches featuring a high degree of mismatch, on the
other hand, are quickly abandoned. This shifts the distribution of matches towards low mismatch, thus
lowering unemployment. We therefore want to change the wage setting mechanism and introduce some
wage rigidity into the model. As for unemployment benefits, introducing path-dependent benefits changes
the dynamics of unemployment flows because incentives are affected. If highly-paid workers obtain high
unemployment benefits, they are more likely to end a match as productivity worsens than if they are paid
the same, lower, unemployment benefits. This means that more matches of high quality get destroyed,
which in turn raises unemployment. Introducing those two extensions into the model is on our research
agenda.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was twofold: first, we wanted to analyse which impact the introduction of skill
mismatch has on the standard search model with endogenous job destruction. This allowed us to examine
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the effect of labour market institutions, namely the replacement rate and firing costs, and to compare
our results to the standard model. We found that qualitatively, the two models yield similar results.
Quantitatively, however, the replacement rate raises the level of unemployment less in the skill mismatch
model than in the model without skill mismatch. We attribute this to the fact that workers use unem-
ployment benefits as a search subsidy and therefore work more frequently in jobs which are characterised
by low skill mismatch and therefore on average a longer duration. This partly outweighs the disincentive
of unemployment benefits which is stressed by models with ex ante homogeneous agents.
The second aim was to assess the extent to which skill mismatch can account for the increase in un-
employment since the 1970s in Europe relative to the US, in a model with endogenous job destruction.
Therefore, we subjected two economic regimes, one a laissez-faire economy (proxying the US), one a
”welfare state” (characterised by a strictly positive replacement rate - thus proxying ”Europe”), to the
same shock. The latter increases the importance of skill mismatch in the production function. It turned
out that, for realistic parameter values, this even lead to a fall in the unemployment rate in both regimes.
We found that this was due to the fact that the distribution of matches shifts towards matches charac-
terised by low mismatch, with a high expected duration. This result stands in contrast with the results
in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) who argue that a shock to skill mismatch, in combination with generous
labour market institutions, can lead to higher unemployment. However, their model features exogenous
job destruction only. Workers are therefore by construction not allowed to hang on longer to a ”good”
job (featuring low skill mismatch) in case of an adverse shock. We therefore view our results as a serious
challenge to Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
From a technical perspective, we showed that, given certain assumptions, two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity
of firms and workers is equivalent to ex-post heterogeneity with fixed match (not agent) characteristics.
This proved helpful in both the analytical solution and the calibration of the model, as the distribution
of vacancies and unemployed workers can be neglected.
More generally, these results lead us to argue that endogenous job destruction should be considered
in any search model in which matches feature characteristics which have an impact on productivity and
which are fixed during the lifetime of a match. The reason for this is that such match characteristics lead
to different reservation productivity thresholds, and hence job destruction decisions, across heterogeneous
matches. This has important implications for the distribution of match quality in the economy and is





































































































Figure 5: Surplus for T = 0, ρ = 0, α = 0.5
A.2 Tables
T= T= T= T= T= T=
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
ρ= 0 4.42 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.44 4.42
ρ= 0.1 4.65 4.66 4.66 4.67 4.66 4.64
ρ= 0.2 4.91 4.92 4.93 4.94 4.95 4.94
ρ= 0.3 5.21 5.23 5.24 5.26 5.26 5.26
ρ= 0.4 5.58 5.60 5.62 5.64 5.66 5.66
ρ= 0.5 6.07 6.07 6.09 6.13 6.15 6.12
Table 3: Unemployment rates at different levels of replacement rate ρ and firing costs T , α = 0.85
A.3 Proofs
A.3.1 Option values
We derive the option values of unemployed workers and of firms offering a vacancy. First, we show how
to represent expectations over functions of two random variables by using established theorems from
measure and integration theory. We then apply these results in order to obtain the option values.
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Let X and Y be two random variables, and let (Ω,F ,P) be a measure space where Ω = Ω1 × Ω2
is a product space, F = F1 × F2 a Borel field of subsets of Ω, and P = P1 × P2 a measure on F .
Furthermore, let (X,Y ) on (Ω,F ,P) induce the probability space (Ω,F , µ), where µ = µx × µy is a
probability measure. Note that µx (µy) is the probability measure induced by X (Y ). Finally, let f be
a function of two variables which is Borel measurable with respect to F1 × F2. Then (for a proof, see
Chung (2001), Section 3.2):
∫
Ω
f(X(ω), Y (ω))P(dω) =
∫ ∫
Ω1×Ω2
f(x, y)µx × µy(dx, dy)
where ω ∈ Ω, and X(ω) (Y (ω)) and x (y) are realisations of X and Y , respectively. Suppose that, in
addition to the above assumptions, f is integrable with respect to µx×µy. Then, Fubini’s theorem holds.












To obtain the worker’s option value, we proceed as follows. Let F and G2 denote the distribution
functions induced by X and Y , and let sf denote the realisation of random variable Y . The right-hand







dF (x). Now, setting Ω1 = Ω2 = [0, 1] and






′, sf ′), Usw)dF (x′)dG2(sf ′)]. The firm’s option value can be derived similarly.
A.3.2 Deriving the expressions for the value functions and wages
Let ∆ denote the length of a time interval, e−r∆ the corresponding discount factor, and l(k, ∆) the
probability of obtaining k job offers within time interval ∆. Then, we can write the value of unemployment
as
















′, sf ′), Usw)dF (x′)dG2(sf ′)]


































max{W osw(x′, sf ′)− Usw, 0}dF (x′)dG2(sf ′)]
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Taking the limit as ∆ → 0, and noting that lim∆→0 1−e−r∆∆ = r, lim∆→0 l(0, ∆) = 1, and lim∆→0 l(1, ∆) =
λ, we get:





max{W osw(x′, sf ′)− Usw, 0}dF (x′)dG2(sf ′) (27)
With free entry (equation (9)) and the first-order condition from the Nash bargain for outside wages










max{W osw(x′, sf ′)− Usw, 0}dF (x′)dG2(sf ′)]
Inserting this result in (8) and using Lemma 1, we obtain
rUsw = (1− τ) · b + (1− τ) β1− β θc (28)
Plugging the corresponding value functions into the FOC of the Nash bargain yields:
(1− τ)β
r + λ
[ϕ(x, sf, sw)− wo(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0




[(1− τ)wo(x, sf, sw) + λ
∫ 1
0
max{Wsw(x′, sf), Usw}dF (x′)− (r + λ)Usw
Using the FOC of the Nash bargain for the expected values, we obtain an expression for the wage:
wo(x, sf, sw) = β[ϕ(1, sf, sw)− λT ] + 1− β
1− τ rUsw
This result, together with (28) implies
wo(x, sf, sw) = (1− β) · b + β[ϕ(x, sf, sw) + θc− λT ] (29)
The inside wage, w(x, sf, sw), can be derived in a similar way.




























where the second equality follows from the fact that, because sf and sw are stochastically independent
random variables and because they share a common support [0, 1], δ is a random variable as well (Chung,
2001, Theorem 3.1.5.). We call the distribution function governing this random variable G(δ). The other
two equalities follow from Fubini’s Theorem (Chung, 2001, p. 63).
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A.3.4 The reservation rules
Here, we show that the reservation productivity depends upon x and δ only, and that the corresponding
reservation values for x and δ exist and are unique. To see this, first note that, because of Nash bargaining
over wages, firms and workers agree on both match formation and separation. Now, insert the expressions
for the outside and the inside wages, equations (12) and (13) into the corresponding value functions,




[(1− β)(ϕ(x, δ)− b)− β[θc− λT ] + λ
∫ 1
0




[(1− β)[ϕ(x, δ)− b]− β[θc + rT ] + λ
∫ 1
0
max{J(x′, δ),−T}dF (x′)] (31)
W o(x, δ) =
1
r + λ




max{W (x′, δ), U}dF (x′)]
W (x, δ) =
1
r + λ




max{W (x′, δ), U}dF (x′)]
The right-hand side is a contraction mapping the space of linear functions in x into itself. As can
readily be verified, the contraction is of modulus ε < 1. We therefore obtain a unique fixed point for each
equation (Cf. Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 3.2.) As the four fixed points are strictly increasing
in x and 1 − δ, the reservation values will be unique, yielding two upper bounds for x and 1 − δ. For
notational reasons, we replace the upper bound for 1− δ with a lower bound for δ.
A.3.5 The equilibrium conditions
In order to derive the job creation condition, we proceed as follows. Substitute equations (12) and (13)
into the expressions for Jo and J , respectively, and Rδ for x in the latter expression. This yields
(r + λ)Jo(1, δ) = (1− β)(ϕ(1, δ)− b)− βθc + βλT + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
J(x′, δ)dF (x′)− F (Rδ)T
(r + λ)J(Rδ, δ) = (1− β)(ϕ(Rδ, δ)− b)− βθc− βrT + λ
∫ 1
Rδ
J(x, δ)dF (x′)− F (Rδ)T
Subtracting the second equation from the first, we get
(r + λ)(Jo(1, δ)− J(Rδ, δ)) = (1− β)(ϕ(1, δ)− ϕ(Rδ, δ)) + βλT + βrT (32)
Integrating over δ and noting that
∫ Rx
0









[ϕ(1, δ′)− ϕ(Rδ, δ′)]dG(δ′)− (1− β)T
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We derive the reservation productivity condition in the following way. We set δ = Rox and x = Rδ in the
equations for Jo and J , respectively. Noting that Jo(1, Rox) = 0 and J(Rδ, δ) = −T while subtracting
the two equations from each other we obtain the requested condition:
ϕ(1, Rox)− ϕ(Rδ, δ) = (r + λ)T
Setting δ = Rox and noting that S(1, R
o
x) = 0, we get
0 = ϕ(1, Rx)− τwo(1, Rox) + λ
∫ 1
0
max{W (x′, δ)− J(x′, δ)− U,−T}dF (x′)− λT − rU (33)
In order to obtain the condition for tightness, set δ = Rox in the value function for a worker’s initial
job and note that W o(1, Rox) = W (Rδ, δ) = U yields
rU = (1− τ)wo(1, Rx) + λ
∫ 1
0
max{W (x′, Rx)− U, 0}dF (x′) (34)




U)dF (x′) < 0 almost everywhere, i.e.
∫ 1
0
max{W (x′, Rx) − U, 0}dF (x′) = 0. This means that when
a match starts with x = 1 and the corresponding value for Rx, then the option value of this match is
zero, because at the next shock to x, the match is going to be destroyed. Using this fact together with
equations (12), (28), and (34), after some manipulation yields the tightness condition:
ϕ(1, Rx) = b +
β
1− β θc + λT (35)
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